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SUCCESSOR COMPANIES: THE NLRB LIMITS THE
OPTIONS-AND RAISES SOME PROBLEMS
LAWRENCE

F. DOPPELT*

COMPANY acquiring a unionized business faces two immediate
labor-relations issues. First, is the successor company obligated to recognize and bargain with the predecessor's union?
Second, assuming such obligation, must the successor also assume its
predecessor's union contract?1 Failure to answer these issues correctly may place the successor in violation of Sections 8(d) and
8 (a) (5)2 of the National Labor Relations Act. 3
In most instances, these questions are resolved by practical, rather
than legal, considerations. Economics, logic, and the realities of
industrial relations generally require that the successor recognize its
predecessor's union, if only to avoid labor turmoil.' No self-respecting union will permit itself to be ousted from an established collective bargaining relationship without some kind of struggle, merely
because of a change in employer ownership, be it economic or legal.
And the last thing most successors want at the time of a business
takeover is labor trouble, whether in the form of a work stoppage, a
picket line, or protracted litigation. 5 Further, where a predecessor's employees are accustomed to union benefits and representation, the successor may validly believe that attempting to operate
A

*
MR. DOPPELT is a partner in the firm of Dorfman, DeKoven & Cohen and
is an Associate Professor of Law at I.I.T.-.Chicago Kent College of Law.
1. An additional ancillary issue is whether the successor assumes its predecessor's legal and contractual liabilities in the area of labor-relations. This is discussed infra.

2.

Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-

ployer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees

."; section 8(d) defines the "duty to bargain."
3.

Hereinafter cited as the Act.

4. As stated in Walker Bros., 41 Lab. Arb. 844, 850 (1963) (Crawford, Arbitrator): "The conduct of purchasers and the clear logic of the economic facts
and the public policy governing union-management relations . . ." dictate that per-

formance of the bargaining obligation lies with the successor employer.
5. Under most circumstances, it would not be illegal for a predecessor's union
to strike or picket a successor refusing to recognize it since, as noted infra, such a

refusal ordinarily constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. C.A.
Blinne Construction, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962); Colony Materials, Inc. v. Rothman,
46 L.R.R.M. 2794 (D.D.C. 1960).
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without a union will result only in employee unrest and future union
organizational efforts, adversely affecting production and efficiency.
A successor recognizing its predecessor's union for the above or
other practical reasons generally assumes the obligations of its predecessor's union contract based on similar considerations. By so assuming the contract, the successor also protects itself in two important respects for the contract term: Its major costs and obligations
will not exceed those set forth in the contract; and, since most contracts contain a "no strike" clause prohibiting union strikes and employee work stoppages," there are basic assurances against severe industral strife. If, on the other hand, the successor recognizes the
predecessor's union without its union contract, it gives the union the
opportunity to engage in collective bargaining for a new contract,
and a sophisticated successor recognizes that, when a union bargains,
it wants "more." 7 Under normal circumstances, it would be naive to
expect a predecessor's union to settle for less than it had in its predecessor's contract, or even for the same thing. Moreover, without a
contract in effect, the union is free to strike and otherwise exert economic force against the successor.
In spite of the above, there are occasions when a successor does
not wish to recognize its predecessor's union and/or assume its predecessor's union contract, even at the risk of extreme labor unrest.
Insofar as union recognition is concerned, a successor may have a
corporate policy opposing unions, believing they adversely affect labor costs and management prerogatives.' Or, a successor operating
other facilities which are not unionized or which are organized by another union, may fear that recognizing the predecessor's union will
adversely affect labor relations at such other facilities.' Further, a
6. 91% of union contracts contain some type of "no-strike" clause, generally
unconditional. Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts, B.N.A. 77:1
(1970).
7. When Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor and
dominant figure in United States labor throughout the early years of this century,
was asked what the labor movement wanted, he answered: "More." For a discussion of what labor means by "more," see SHULTZ & COLEMAN, LABOR PROBLEMS 67
et seq. (2ded. 1957).

8. Of course, there are also employers who oppose unions as a matter of "principle."
9. E.g., such a successor having unorganized employees may believe that recognizing the predecessor's union will give its non-union employees union ideas, or
lead the predecessor's union to try to organize such other employees. Or, if the
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successor may withhold union recognition as a bargaining lever, using it as a lure to secure bargaining concessions. Finally, a successor
may sincerely believe that its predecessor's employees are dissatisfied with their union, and that they should be given a fresh opportunity to decide for themselves whether or not they want the union.
Even if a successor is willing to recognize its predecessor's union,
there are occasions when it may not wish to assume its predecessor's
union contract, believing it can negotiate desired changes. The successor may consider the contract's economic terms too harsh or its
operational language too limiting. Or, it may believe that certain
economic or managerial terms which suited the predecessor's business are not applicable to the new ownership. Alternatively, it may
simply deem that it has the economic strength or will to negotiate a
better deal than its predecessor.
Whatever the successor's motive for not recognizing its predecessor's union and/or assuming its union contract, the National Labor
Relations Board,' ° in a series of decisions spanning 25 years" and
climaxing only recently,' 2 has severely limited the successor's options. First holding that a successor must generally recognize its
predecessor's union, and finally requiring that it must ordinarily
assume its predecessor's union contract, the Board has effectively
barred a successor's choices in all but exceptional or unique situations."3
Thus, as early as the mid-1940's, the Board held that where a
predecessor company is obligated to recognize and bargain with a
union, such obligation "runs with the employing industry and is bindsuccessor deals with another union at one or more of its other facilities, it may
deem that recognizing the predecessor's union will put it in a squeeze play between
two competing labor organizations, each trying to outdo each other and prove their

worth at the successor's expense. On the other hand, certain successors would not
wish to see the same union that it has at some facilities at a new location, fearing
that such would give one union a stranglehold over all its operations.
10.

Hereinafter cited as the Board.

11. South Carolina Granite Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1944), cited in the following
paragraph, was one of the first in a long series of successorship cases.
12. William J. Bums International Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 50
(1970). See note 37, infra.
13. The cases and situations dealt with herein assume that the successor is a
bona fide purchaser of the predecessor's business, not an alter ego thereof, and
that the successor's acquisition is not a colorable transaction designed to evade union
recognition.

1971]

179

SUCCESSOR COMPANIES

14
ing on a bona fide successor company as well as on its predecessor.'
A predecessor's obligation so to recognize and bargain with a validly
recognized union was thereafter defined to include, inter alia, the obligation to continue dealing with such union unless the employer
could establish a good faith doubt as to the union's continued majority status.1
Accordingly, the Board's successorship doctrine 6
firmed into the presently established rule that a successor employer
must normally recognize and bargain with the union representing its
predecessor's employees unless the successor can establish that it had
a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status at the time the
union requested successor recognition. 1 7 The rule's purpose is to
enhance "stabilized industrial relations"' 8 by not requiring employees continually to demonstrate their union desires "in an employing industry which is periodically subject to a possible change of
employers."' 9

The foregoing successorship doctrine contains two tempting
loopholes for recalcitrant successors. First, the rule applies only if
the "employing industry" remains the same after the acquisition;
otherwise, the purchaser is not deemed to be a "successor" within
the meaning of the law, thereby obviating successorship bargaining
obligations.2 0 Second, there is, in any event, no bargaining obliga14. South Carolina Granite Company, supra note 11, aff'd. 152 F.2d 25 (4th
Cir. 1945); Northwest Glove Co., Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1697 (1947).
15. Cf. Celanese Corporation of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
16. With court approval.
17. NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960); N.L.R.B. v.
Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952); Witham Buick, 139 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1962);
Firchau Logging Company, 126 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1960); Ugite Gas, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B.
494 (1960); Downtown Bakery, 139 N.L.R.B. 1352 (1962), enf'd in part 303 F.2d

921 (6th Cir. 1964); West Suburban Transit, 158 N.L.R.B. 794 (1966); N.L.R.B. v.
Laystrom, 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1966); Diamond National Corp., 133 N.L.R.B.
268 (1961); Snow v. N.L.R.B., 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).

During the year

following a union's certification, neither a predecessor nor successor employer can
refuse to recognize the union except for "unusual circumstances." Cruse Motors,
105 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953); Celanese Corp., supra note 15.

Moreover, if there is a valid collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time
of acquisition, the successor may not, during the life thereof, assert a good faith
doubt as to the union's majority status so as to relieve it of an otherwise existing
bargaining obligation. Ranch-Way, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 116 (1970).
18.
19.
20.

Cruse Motors, 105 N.L.R.B. 242, 246 (1953).
Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1302 (1964).
United Texas Petroleum, 153 N.L.R.B. 849 (1965);

Tennsco Corp.,

141

N.L.R.B. 296 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1964).
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tion if the successor can establish a good faith doubt of the union's
majority status at the time of a bargaining request. 2
However, except for unique situations, the Board has firmly closed
these escape hatches by broadly construing the term "employing industry," and narrowly interpreting "good faith doubt." Thus, in determining whether the "employing industry" remains the same, the
controlling standard in each case is "whether the employment enterprise substantially or essentially continues under the new ownership
as before,"22 with "substantial continuity in the employing enterprise."" This broad standard is squarely met if the acquiring company continues "essentially the same operation with substantially the
same employee unit, ' 24 or if there is a "basic similarity" between the
selling and acquiring concerns.23
If such standard is met, an
acquiring concern is a "successor," inheriting its predecessor's bargaining obligations, regardless of whether the acquistion is accomplished by stock transfer, purchase or acquisition of assets, lease, or
takeover of a bankrupt's assets. 26 Indeed, it makes no basic difference that the purchase contract specifically excludes the successor's
assumption of its predecessor's liens, encumbrances, liabilities, obligations, good will, name, or even premises, or that the successor fails
to hire a majority of the predecessor's employees.2 7 Clearly, an employer, operating a purchased company with any kind of "basic similarity" and retaining a majority of predecessor employees, will be hard
21. Diamond National Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 268 (1961); Mitchell Standard, 140
N.L.R.B. 496 (1963).
Note, however, that the successor may not assert such a
doubt if there is a current collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time of
takeover. Ranch-Way, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 116 (1970).
22. Cruse Motors, supra note 18, at 247, a frequently cited statement.
23. Randolph Rubber Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 496, 499 (1965).
24. Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1301 (1964).
This means that a
majority of the successor's employee unit should be made up of the predecessor's
employees; however, it is not necessary that the successor hire a majority of the
predecessor's employees.
Goldberg, Successor Employer's Labor Obligations, 63
Nw. U.L. REV. 735, 793-94 (1969).
25. West Suburban Transit Lines, Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 794, 797 (1966).
26. Maintenance, Inc., supra note 24; Johnson Ready Mix, 142 N.L.R.B. 437
(1963); West Suburban Transit Lines, supra note 25. See also cases cited supra
notes 14 and 17.
27. In addition to cases cited at note 26 supra, see Colony Materials, Inc., 130
N.L.R.B. 105 (1961); Chemrock Corporation, 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965).
Two
cases in which the Board went about as far as it ever has in finding successorship
situations are West Suburban Transit-Lines, supra note 25 and Johnson Ready Mix,
supra-note 26. ...
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put to escape a successorship label."'
It is similarly difficult for a successor to establish a good faith
doubt of a predecessor union's majority status in order to relieve it
of a bargaining obligation. If the predecessor's union was validly
recognized, a presumption of continued majority status arises at the
time of the successor's acquisition.29 The burden of proof is on the
successor to rebut such presumption by establishing that it has "reasonable grounds" for doubting the union's majority status, "supported
by objective considerations."3 0 This is a heavy burden to sustain,
for it is not satisfied by proof of even the following factors: Reports
of employee dissatisfaction with the union, high labor turnover, poorly
attended union meetings, and failure of employees to pay union
dues."' There are not too many other approaches available to a successor whereby it can attack a union's majority status.3 2
Some determined employers have tried yet another method to avoid
the successorship obligation: they have refused to hire the predecessor's employees, thereby claiming that the "employee unit" was
wholly destroyed in the changeover, thus vitiating any bargaining obligation. This tactic, however, can backfire, often with disastrous results, for an employer's failure to hire its predecessor's employees in
order to rid itself of its predecessor's union is clearly unlawful under
the Act,3 3 and subjects the employer to an order requiring reinstatement and back pay for wrongfully rejected employees.3 4 A pur28. Two cases where the Board found no successorship involved purchasers acquiring prior business concerns in a shutdown condition, and not as going operations.
United Texas Petroleum, supra note 20; Tennsco Corp., supra note 20.
29. West Suburban Transit Lines, supra note 25; Mitchell Standard Corp., supra
note 21; Watertown Undergarment Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 287, 303 (1962).
30. West Suburban Transit Lines, supra note 25; Celanese Corp., supra note 15;
Laystrom Manufacturing, 151 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1965), rev'd 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir.
1966).
31. Randolph Rubber Co., supra note 23; West Suburban Transit Lines, supra
note 25; United States Gypsum Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1963); United States
Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964 (1950).
32. Two cases in which the Board found that successors had sustained their
burden of proof seem to be unique situations which have, in effect, been so limited.
Diamond National Corp., supra note 21; Mitchell Standard, supra note 21. The
Courts do not always hold a successor to as strict a burden as the Board. Cf.
N.L.R.B. v. Laystrom Mfg., 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1966).
33. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice to discriminate
"in regard to hire or tenure of employment.. . to discourage membership in any
labor organization."
34. New England Tank Industries, 133 N.L.R.B. 175 (1961), enfd 302 F.2d

182
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chaser's wholesale refusal to hire its predecessor's employees raises

an inference of unlawful motivation; it is difficult to explain why,
"despite the presence of a pool of experienced workers," the succes-

sor "went to considerable lengths to replace union employees with
entirely new workers."3 5
While the Board's established successorship rules have long required that a successor generally recognize its predecessor's union,
they have not, until recently, obligated the successor to assume its
predecessor's union contract. Accepting the theory of "privity of
contract," the Board consistently held that a successor was not obli-

gated to assume any union contract to which it was not a party."6 Accordingly, a successor, although obligated to recognize its predecessor's union, had the choice of rejecting its predecessor's contract and
negotiating a new agreement in lieu thereof.
However, the Board has now eliminated such option, holding in the
recent William J. Burns InternationalDetective Agency, Inc., 7 case
that, absent unusual circumstances, "national labor policy . . . re-

quires the successor employer to take over and honor a collective
bargaining agreement negotiated on behalf of the employing enterprise by the predecessor." This means that a non-consenting suc-

cessor employer is now bound to its predecessor's contract as if it
were a signatory thereto, and failure to honor the contract is violative
of Sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. A successor's failure to
adopt its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement may result
273 (1st Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371 U.S. 875 (1962); Piasecki Aircraft Corp., 123
N.L.R.B. 348 (1959), enf'd 280 F.2d 575 (3rd Cir. 1960), cert. den. 364 U.S. 933
(1961); Barney Wilkerson Construction, 145 N.L.R.B. 704 (1963); Alton-Arlan's
Dept. Store, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1965).
35. N.L.R.B. v. New England Tank Industries, 302 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1962).
Further, failure of a successor to hire key union supporters may raise an inference
of unlawful conduct. West Suburban Transit Lines, Inc., supra note 25.
36. Krantz Wire Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 971 (1952), ajf'd 199 F.2d 800 (7th
Cir. 1952); Chemrock Corp., supra note 27, at 1079. Ct. West Suburban Transit
Lines, supra note 25, at 799 n.8.
37. 182 N.L.R.B. 50 (1970). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a decision rendered April 26, 1971, (- F.2d -), after this article was written, reversed
that portion of the Board's Burns decision requiring that the successor employer
honor its predecessor's contract, holding that the Board exceeded its powers by ordering the successor to so honor such contract. William Cavers, Regional Attorney
for the 13th Regional Office of the National Labor Relations Board, has advised that
the Board presently has under consideration the question of whether or not it will
seek certiorari, but that it has not yet made a decision.
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in liability for any benefits lost by employees as a result thereof.8 s
Burns is undoubtedly a significant expansion of Board policy for
never before had the Board required that a non-consenting succes40
sor 9 take on its predecessor's union contract, as well as its union.
At first blush, Burns seems subject to easy criticism. On its face,
it violates one of those cornerstones of Anglo-American jurisprudence, privity of contract. Further, it seems contrary to generally
accepted assumptions of law and equity to require a non-consenting
employer to assume a contract to which it was not a party and which
it specifically excluded from a sales contract. Indeed, such a farreaching Board holding could be expected to send shock waves
through the labor-management community.
However, upon more mature consideration, it is difficult to fault
the Board for its Burns decision. For one thing, the Board was not
truly setting labor policy in this instance; rather, it was merely following labor policy previously set forth in court cases in which it was
not involved. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held in the
celebrated case of Wiley v. Livingston4 that where a small organized
predecessor was merged into a large unorganized corporation, the
surviving corporation was obligated to arbitrate grievances arising
under the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. Just a
few months thereafter, basing its decision on the Wiley case, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a successor which had purchased a predecessor's assets 42was obligated to honor the latter's collective bargaining agreement.
38. William J. Burns, supra note 12. As the other side of the coin, a successor
employer may insist upon the union's adherence to the contract it negotiated with
the predecessor.

39.

Kota Division of Dura Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 51 (1970).

The standards for determining successorship in Burns are the same as those

discussed supra in prior Board cases.
40. In Overnite Transportation Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), a/i'd 372 F.2d

765 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. den. 389 U.S. 838 (1967), the Board held, in effect,
that a successor could not unilaterally change a predecessor's union contract without
first bargaining such with the union. However, such bargaining obligation is far
from requiring the successor to accept the contract, as such, since a successor could,

under Overnite, change the contract after bargaining to an impasse with the union.
41. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). This case
arose under § 301 of the N.L.R.A. as a suit between private parties to enforce arbi-

tration
42.
§ 301
clined

under a collective bargaining agreement.
Wackenhut Corp. v. Plant Guards, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964), also a
action. The Third Circuit, in a case decided shortly after Wackenhut, deto go quite as far in a similar proceeding, holding that where a successor
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Even more important than the precise holding of Wiley is the principle for which it stands, for therein the Supreme Court decreed:
While the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a con-

tract an unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract.

".

.

. [Ilt is a generalized code to govern a myriad

of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. . . . The collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new common
law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant."' 43

Thus, it was the Supreme Court which not only paved the road for
the Board's Burns decision, but escorted the Board most of the way
down it.
Further, it appears fair to state that with Burns the Board has
"caught up with the exigencies of the collective bargaining community [and] recognized the realities of the employer-employee relalationship. '' 44 After all, Burns merely codifies what most employers
and unions do in any event, 45 and it thereby fulfills the reasonable
expectations of the union and employer involved. It also fulfills the
expectations of the predecessor's employees. Having become accustomed to living by the contract as the law of the shop, they reasonably anticipate that such law will continue to govern their employment relationship in the future, just as it has in the past.
Permitting a successor to flout such reasonable expectations by rejecting a predecessor's union contract may result in industrial instability. Employees are carefully taught by both unions and employers that the union contract is, indeed, the shop law. It governs
the actions of all parties: Employees as well as employers are expected to abide thereby.46 Moreover, employees know they have secured their contractual rights through the give and take of collective
bargaining, often ceding desired ends in order to obtain others. If
acquired a predecessor's operations the predecessor's contract was the "basic charter"

for the parties but that an arbitrator, taking into account changes caused by the new
ownership, would be empowered to make alterations therein based on equity. Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, 335 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir. 1964).
43. Wiley v. Livingston, supra note 41, at 550.
44. In re Interscience Encyclopedia, et al., 55 Lab. Arb. 210, 220
(Roberts, Arbitrator). Such case in the arbitral sequence to Wiley.
45. See supra note 4.

(1970)

46. For example, an employee may be discharged for violating contract terms or
reasonable plant rules; further, if an employee believes a contract right is being
violated he must seek relief within the contract's procedures rather than through

self-help.
(1967).

Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, B.N.A. 109, 350 et seq.
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employees observe contractual law being ignored by the successor,
with their contractual gains dissipated, they are trained that industrial laws may be disregarded by parties at opportune moments. This,
of course, invites industrial lawlessness, disrespect for industrial rules,
and overall cynicism of the entire collective bargaining process.
The Burns rule, on the other hand, can further the basic labor
policy of avoiding "industrial strife." 7 With Burns, all parties know
where they stand from the outset of their relationship. They are
aware of their mutual rights and obligations. This ordinarily reduces confrontations and disputes, necessarily adding to labor stability. Further, a successor's refusal to honor a predecessor's union
contract can lead to strikes and other labor unrest, hardly enhancing
the Act's aim of minimizing industrial strife.
Finally, Burns protects those most needing protection. The successor, of course, can protect itself against much of the unfairness
otherwise inherent in Burns. It can ascertain the terms of a prede-

cessor's union contract before making an acquisition, and consider
any burdensome terms in deciding whether to close the deal or to
seek financial concessions from the predecessor. The employees, on
the other hand, may have no protection without a contract. While
there is, indeed, a breed of enlightened employers, there is also the
employer who is enlightened only if legally or economically forced to
be. Left to his own devices, such employer could deprive employees
of valuable contractual gains, including wages, benefits and job se48
curity accumulated only after long, hard struggles.
Policy considerations aside, Burns nevertheless raises various issues which should be recognized in order to avoid possible future liabilities. In addition to the obvious new rights and liabilities created
by the decision, additional underlying obligations and responsibilities may be created as a result of Burns.
For example, Burns poses the question whether a successor may
47. The preamble to the Act.
48. Moreover, prior to Burns, an economically powerful successor had a golden
opportunity to break a weak union altogether. A union, after all, is a political
body. It must please its constituents or face ouster. If a successor were able to
force a union to negotiate a contract containing lesser benefits than those set forth
in its predecessor's contract, it could mean the union's demise. Under normal circumstances, employees would discard, or ignore, a union negotiating a poorer contract with a successor than it had with its predecessor.
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continue to hire only those employees it deems acceptable from among
the predecessor's work force. Previously, an employer acquiring another's operations assumed it could start from scratch in hiring and
interviewing its predecessor's employees, retaining as new employees
only those it thought acceptable. This is not to say that the successor
does not generally intend ultimately to hire most of the predecessor's
employees; indeed, the existence of such an available work force is
often a major reason for an acquisition. However, the successor generally believes it can reject those predecessor's employees it believes
unacceptable, hiring totally new employees from outside sources and
selecting only the elite of the predecessor's work force for available
positions.
The Board has, in the past, acknowledged a successor's discretion
so to choose its own work force. Indeed, in a relatively recent case,
the Board specifically stated:
We do not hold . . . that the purchaser of an enterprise is legally obligated to refrain from making any changes in the employment status of his predecessor's employees or to continue their employment under existing terms and conditions of em49
ployment.

Prior Board cases involving successorship issues recognize the successor's right to interview its predecessor's employees and, except
where otherwise discriminatorily motivated, hire only those it deems
acceptable.5 0
But Burns may have drastically changed the rules of the game, for
a successor now generally assumes its predecessor's union contract.
Such contract will almost certainly limit the successor's right to reject employees or to select employees for available jobs. 5' Thus, in
the past, a successor frequently rejected those predecessor employees
it considered did not meet its standards, basing its rejections on
interviews or other considerations. Although such standards were
49. Chemrock Corporation, supra note 27 n.8. The N.L.R.B. there held that
a successor employer could not refuse to bargain with the predecessor's union
above the retention of the predecessor's employees. However, it specifically denied

the allegations, contained in a dissenting opinion, that it was compelling a successor to hire the predecessor's employees.
50. West Suburban Transit Lines, supra note 25; Krantz Wire, supra note 36;

Johnson Ready Mix, supra note 26.
51.

The great majority of union contracts specify the procedures to be followed

in choosing employees for available jobs, and 92% of all such contracts place some
limitations on the right to discharge.

tracts, supra note 6, at § § 40:1, 60:11.

Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Con-

1971]

SUCCESSOR COMPANIES

often vague, the successor was under no greater burden to justify any
such rejections than in the case of new hires. However, almost any
union contract now assumed by a successor, as a result of Burns, will
require that employees be discharged only for "fair" or "just cause," 52
meaning, under the contract's grievance and arbitration procedures,5"
the employer has the burden of proving an employee has engaged in
serious or repeated misconduct in order to justify a discharge. 4 Such
a clause would, quite possibly, protect a predecessor's employees:
They are technically the successor's employees at the time of the
business transfer,5 5 and the successor's failure to hire them is in effect a discharge. Thus, the successor's right to reject those predecessor employees it deems unacceptable without showing a justifiable
reason therefor would be severely limited.
Even if a successor does not reject predecessor employees as unacceptable, it generally assumes its right to select the best employees for
available jobs in the event it reduces operations when it takes over
the business. But the prior union contract would almost certainly
make employee seniority the sole or determining factor in deciding
who should be retained in work force reduction,56 or at least require
that able senior employees be given job preference. 57 Since the predecessor's employees would, presumably, retain their full contractual
seniority with the successor, 58 this could require the successor to retain the most senior employees or the most qualified senior employees,
rather than the best employees. This would render its right of selection non-existent. Accordingly, an employer acquiring another's
business in any manner, intending to operate it in essentially the
same manner, should carefully examine the risks before rejecting or
selecting among its predecessor's employees.
52. Id.
53. Most all union contracts contain a grievance and arbitration procedure. Id.
at § 51:6.
54. How Arbitration Works, supra note 46, at 417. The authors state: "Discharge is recognized to be the extreme industrial penalty ... Because of the
seriousness of this penalty, the burden is generally held to be on the employer to
prove guilt of wrongdoing ......
55. Chemrock Corporation, supra note 27.
56. Supra note 51.
57. How Arbitration Works, supra note 46.
58. In re Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., supra note 44; P.M. Northwest, 42
Lab. Arb. 961 (1964). As a matter of logic, also, if a successor takes over the
predecessor's contract, seniority accrued thereunder is also assumed.
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A second underlying question raised by Burns is whether a successor's established pension plan will be applicable to the predecessor's employees. A successor acquiring another's operations may
well have a retirement plan covering its own employees. Such plan
would, commonly, grant retirement benefits based, inter alia, on the
employees' length of service, or seniority, with the employer. Under
Burns the possibility exists that a successor might find that its retirement plan, depending on the wording thereof, applies to its predecessor's employees, with full credit granted thereunder for the employees' past service with the predecessor. For example, a successor's plan may cover all "employees," with full credit for all "past
service" or "seniority." Since a predecessor's employees become
"employees" of the successor, with presumably full credit for their
"past service" and "seniority" under the predecessor's contract, they
could thus be covered under a literal reading of the plan.
This is not to say that all successor retirement plans would automatically or necessarily apply to a predecessor's employees. Many
retirement plans exclude, by their terms, employees of newly-or after-acquired companies. Others define seniority with sufficient precision so as to exclude employees of predecessor operations or others
not meant to be covered thereby, or otherwise limit their creditable
service. A successor's retirement plan containing such exclusionary
language59 in advance of the acquisition of a predecessor would serve
to eliminate predecessor employees therefrom.
A successor employer having a broadly defined retirement plan
lacking such exclusionary language and otherwise "covering" its
predecessor's employees, however, may find it difficult to amend its
plan to exclude predecessor employees therefrom after a transfer has
occurred. Where employees are represented by a union, as the predecessor's would be, a company may not unilaterally and without bargaining with the union modify existing employee benefit programs,
including retirement plans, so as adversely to affect the rights of
union employees covered by such plan.6" This prohibition applies
59. The type of exclusionary language set forth above would not seem unlawful
under the Act unless otherwise discriminatorily motivated.
60. Toffenetti Restaurant, 136 N.L.R.B. 1156 (1962), afI'd 311 F.2d 219 (2nd
Cir. 1962); Leeds & Northrup, 162 N.L.R.B. 987 (1967), aff'd 391 F.2d 874
(3rd Cir. 1968); Beacon Journal, 164 N.L.R.B. 734 (1967); Southland Paper Mills,
Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
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even though the retirement plan was, initially, unilaterally instituted
on a voluntary basis by the employer, was never made part of the
collective bargaining agreement, and was never negotiated by the
union. 6 ' Thus, if it were held the successor's plan did apply to the
predecessor's employees, the successor could not alter that plan without first bargaining each change with the union.
Accordingly, an employer anticipating acquisitions should modify
any existing retirement plan in advance thereof to exclude employees of after-or newly-acquired employers, or to limit the creditIt may well be too late to do
able service of predecessor employees.
62
so after an acquisition occurs.
Still another issue raised by Burns is whether a successor must
credit the seniority that its predecessor's employees accrued with its
predecessor. The celebrated case of Zdanok v. Glidden6 3 could have
stood for such a proposition of vested seniority. 64 However, it had
been thought that Glidden was formally overruled and interred,65
amply disposing of any such theory. Accordingly, one was able to
assume that a successor employer did not take on the seniority of its
predecessor's employees unless it agreed to do so. 66 And, as previously noted, many successors, with implied Board approval, procedded on such assumption, considering predecessor employees to be
new employees with seniority dating only from employment with the
successor.
Such an assumption is no longer valid under Burns. Since a suc61. Id.
62. The Board, in a long line of cases, has held the maintenance and continuance of a retirement plan excluding employees therefrom based on union representation to be inherently unlawful. Melville Confections, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1334
(1963), aff'd 327 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1964); Jim O'Donnell, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B.
1639 (1959); Dura Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 285 (1965), enf'd 380 F.2d 970 (6th Cir.

1967); Channel Master Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1343 (1964); Jefferson Wire & Cable
Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1966). It might be difficult for a successor to show that
an amendment excluding unionized predecessor employees from its retirement plan
does not fall within such prohibition.
63. Zdanok v. Glidden, 288 F.2d 99 (2nd Cir. 1961).
64. The Glidden holding could be cited for the proposition that seniority rights
survived the termination of a collective bargaining agreement and/or a plant relocation. Id.
65.

Proctor & Gamble Ind. Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181

(2nd Cir. 1962); UAW v. Robertshaw Controls, 405 F.2d 29 (2nd Cir. 1968).
66. Cf. Madison-White Motors, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 759 (1963) (Anderson, arbitrator).
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cessor, consenting or not, assumes its predecessor's contract, it presumably assumes the seniority of the predecessor's employees thereunder. The predecessor's employees thus come to the successor with

seniority intact.

Accordingly, the predecessor employees' seniority

is, in effect, vested insofar as vacation rights, job security provisions,
work assignments and other contractual rights are concerned. Terminated employees could, depending on the contract, be entitled to
pro-rata vacation, severance, and other benefits. Thus, a successor
may now be taking on new and unexpected liabilities along with its
predecessor employees' seniority.
Finally, 67 a question arises under Burns whether a successor assumes its predecessor's pre-existing contractual liabilities. A union
contract, of course, typically establishes numerous employer obligations, with resulting liability for failure to fulfill them.6 It is quite
possible that a predecessor breached its union contract, thereby accruing unsatisfied contractual liabilities at the time of an acquisition.
It appears that a successor should now be prepared to accept such
pre-existing predecessor liabilities. Since a non-consenting successor
assumes a predecessor's contract, it would, presumably, also assume
accrued liabilities thereunder. 69 Indeed, any contrary holding would
conflict with the Burns policy of protecting employees against ownership changes, for, if successors do not inherit such predecessor
liabilities, employees would lose rights otherwise enforcible against
the predecessor. 7° The Board already holds a successor liable for
67. "Finally," that is, for this article. This is not to say that other issues may
not be raised by Burns. For example, the Board and courts have yet to struggle
seriously with defining the "unusual circumstances" which will excuse a successor
from the Burns requirements. Cf. Travelodge Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 52 (1970); Avenue Meat Cutter, 184 N.L.R.B. 94 (1970).
68. In addition to creating minimum wage schedules, wage progressions, and
wage increases, a contract generally spells out fringe benefit obligations, such as
employee holidays, vacations, overtime rights, insurance benefits, retirement benefits,
etc.; employee seniority rights in layoffs and promotions; and restrictions on various
management rights.
69. Cf. Walker Bros., 41 Lab. Arb. 759 (1963) (Crawford, Arbitrator), holding
that where a non-consenting successor assumed a predecessor's union contract as a
result of a "successorship" clause, it was primarily liable for pre-existing liabilities
accrued thereunder.
70. A successor could attempt to protect itself against unforeseen contract liabilities by providing in the purchase contract that the predecessor must reimburse it
for such. However, in many instances the seller is no longer in existence after
an acquisition.
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pre-existing unfair labor practices committed by a predecessor; 7 it
is but a short step to hold a successor likewise liable for its predecessor's pre-existing contractual obligations. Accordingly, a successor may well acquire more liabilities as a result of Burns than appear
on the face of a contract.
In view of the above, it is clear that, with Burns, most major successorship issues have now been answered. Burns is the finishing
touch in a long line of cases which have gradually, consistently, and
firmly limited a successor's options vis-d-vis its predecessor's union.
However, just as plainly, certain issues are now raised which call for
rapid responses. Although such remaining issues may be peripheral,
rather than central, to the area of successorship, 72 they create potentially important new rights and liabilities for the parties.

71. United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), af 'd 398
F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968). There, the successor was charged with notice of the predecessor's unfair labor practices; however, close reading of the decision's rationale indicates this was not a central factor.
72. John H. Fanning, Board Member, recently stated in an October 19, 1970,
address to the Connecticut Bar Association that as a result of Burns "there remain
some peripheral issues still to be decided." 203 D.L.R., D-1, B.N.A. (Oct. 19,
1970).

